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ABSTRACT
Several empirical studies have found that intlation has adverse effects on economic growth. In the
present thc,rxetical paper we analyze the implications of such supply side effects for two prototype
monetary models. Both an expectations eugmented Phillips curve and a Barro and Gordon type uf
model are combined with an inFlation sensitive growth rate in the natural level of output. We tind
that the steady state intlation rate is increased and the steady state output growth rate is reduce~l.
Hence due to the supply side effects time consistent monetary policy has a stagtlationary hias.
This is a major difference with the standard Barro and Gordon model and strengthens the case t'ur
central bank independence. Also we tind that the extent of cyclical tluctuations. measured by the
asymptotic variance of intlation is increascd. These results are robust with r~pect to expectations
fiirmatiim. i.e. Ihey hulJ irrospective uf whether inflatiun expe~ta[ions are determined adaptively
ur ratiunallv.1
I INTRODUCTIONt
As stated by Stanners (1993, p. 79) there can hardly be a more universally or firmly
held belief than that low or zero inflation is an essential or at least very important
condition for high and sustained growth, and that its attainment sltould be a main aim of
government economic policy. For instance, in a recent paper Andrew Crockett, Executive
Director of the Bank of England states that" it is generally accepted that price stability not
only contributes to social equity, but is central to the goa! of improving resource
allocation and strengthening the basis of economic growth. "2 Thus policymakers typical-
ly believe that inflation has important adverse effects on long run economic performance.
Previous work on the relationship between inflation and growth is entirely empirical,
with no theoretical discussion of cause and effect. T'his is not so in the present paper. We
analyze the implications of the supply side effect of inflation for two prototype monetary
models. Both an expectations augmented Phillips curve and a Barro and Gordon (1983)
type of model are combined with an inflation sensitive growth rate in the natural level of
output.
We find that the steady state inflation rate is increased, the steady state output growth
rate is reduced, and that the extent of cyclical fluctuations, measured by the asymptotic
variance of inflation is increased. These results hold irrespective of whether inflation
expectations are determined adaptively or rationally.
The paper is organized into five remaining sections, followed by an appendix. Section
2 brietly outlines the empirical evidence supporting a negative relationship between
inflation and output. Section 3 derives a relationship between output and inflation by
combining an inflation sensitive growth rate in the natural level of output with an
expectations augmented Phillips curve. The model is closed in different ways in sections 4
and 5. In section 4 a dynamic aggregate demand curve is used. In section 5 inflation and
growth are determined as in Barro and Gordon (1983) type models. That is, time-
consistent monetary policy is analyzed where the central bank minimizes a social loss
function. It is necessary to make some assumptions about the determinants of inflationary
expectations. We assume in tum, in both sections 4 and 5, a simple adaptive expectations
process and rational expectations and derive and discuss the resulting model behavior.
Our conclusions are given in section 6. Appendix provides the derivation of the asympto-
tic variances of output and inflation. Finally in appendix B we explain the implicit
differentiation which is applied in section 5.
An rarlier venion of this paper was written while David Smyth was a visitor at thr CtntER tiir
Eeonomic Research. Titburg Univtrsity. Eric Schaling gratefully acknowlr.elgas tinancial wpporl
from the NrtharlanJs Organizrlinn for Suentitic Rruarch (NWO). Thr authon arc gratrful fur
helpful eomments by Bas van Aarlr. Harry Huizinga, two anonymous rcfarees and seminar
participants at CentER. Of course, the usual disclaimrr applits.
- Sre Crcxkett (1994).z
II EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE SUPPLY SIDE EFFECTS OF INFLATION
Previous work provides support for a significant and substantial negative relationship
between inflation or the change in the rate of inflation or both on output growth. The
studies can be classified into two types, cross-country analyses and time series analyses
for individual countries.
Using post-war data from forty-seven countries Kormendi and Meguire (1985)
examined the cross-sectional relationship between output growth and a number of
variables. They found a strong negative effect of change between the rate of inflation and
output growth.
Kormendi and Meguire's work was extended by Grier and Tullock (1989) who used
pooled cross-section and five-year average time series data for 113 countries, the
Summers and Heston data set. Three inFlation variables were used in the analysis, the rate
of inflation, its first difference and the standard deviation of inflation. Grier and Tullock
reported results for a number of country classifications and found that in some, but not
all, of the cases there was a negative relationship between one or more of the inflation
variables and economic growth.
In addition to these published studies there are some unpublished analyses. Kahn et
al. (1992, p.17) report that "a preliminary empirical study by OECD staff that found a
10-percentage-point increase in inflation is associated with about a one-percentage-point
slowing of productivity growth for a sample of 18 OECD countries over three periods
(1960-73, ]973-79 and 1980-90) (..). These estimated effects are larger than those found
in studies, such as Fischer (1992) and Corbo and Rojas (1992), that include developing
countries."
All these cross-country studies include a number of variables other than the inflation
variables. This is not so in Stanners (1993). Using mainly graphical analysis, Stanners
compared growth rates and intlation across a variety of groupings for 14 countries for the
period 1980 to 1988 and found no connection between growth rates and inflation. He
reached the same conclusion with time series data for individual countries. However,
Stanners' study is fatally flawed because no explanatory variables, other than inflation,
are included in either his cross-section or his time series analyses.
Jarrett and Selody (1982) used a causality approach [o Canadian data and found that a
permanent one percentage rate increase in inflation reduced productivity by more than
three-tenths of a percentage point.
Grimes (1991) applied regression analysis to data for 21 countries and concluded that
"the costs of even a low inflation rate are estimated to be large given that it is the growth
rate, not just the level of output, which is affected by inFlation." (Grimes 1991, p.ti41).
Surprisingly, Fischer (1993), shows in linear equations that the statistical significance
of the negative association between intlation and growth is stronger t'or intlation below IS
percent than for higher inFlation rates.
Finally, Smyth (1994) quantified the effect of intlation on growth by embedding an
inflation variable in an empirical growth relationship for the U.S. business sector. He
found that for each one percentage point increase in intlation the annual growth rate is3
reduced by 0.19 percentage points.
As shown Levine and Renelt (1992) the growth equation is sensitive to regressor set
specification. This means the impact of inflation on growth is sensitive to the introduction
of other regressors. Thus according to the "Levine and Renelt Critique" inFlation is not
robustly correlated with growth.
Nevertheless policymakers typically believe that inflation has important adverse
effects on long run economic performance. The question is then whether what the many
know is merely difficult to prove, or rather is substantially exaggerated (Fischer (1984),
p. 33).
We follow the tirst avenue of thought. In the next section we assume that there exists
an inverse relationship between inflation and growth and combine this relationship with an
expectations augmented Phillips curve.
III THE SUPPLY SIDE EFFECT OF INFLATION AND THE EXPECTATIONS AUG-
MENTED PHILLIPS CURVE
We assume that the growth rate in the natural level of output is governed by
py~ - ao - a~Op~ f S~ ó~ - N(0, l) ao ~ 0 0 c at c I(1)
The inflation term results from the supply side effect of inFlation. The higher the rate of
inflation, the slower the rate of growth in the natural level of output. The variable bi is a
productivity shock. It has mean zero, is serially uncorrelated, and following Fischer and
Cooper (1973), p. 852 without loss of generality has variance unity.
Note that if ai - 0 for the level of the natural rate of output we have a simple
stochastic trend specification discussed in Stock and Watson ( 1988). This specification
says that over the long run the natural rate of output will grow at some average rate,
labelled ao. However, shocks to productivity, ó~, can cause output growth to deviate from
its mean. Moreover, these shocks are persistent with respect to the level of the natural
rate: once perturbed by an bi shock, y will show no tendency to return to its trendline.
Hence, the supply shocks are assumed to have permanent effects on the economy's
productive capacity.
The actual level of output is given by
Yc - Y~ ' h (~Pc - E~-iOPc) h 1 0 (2)
Equation (2) is an expectations augmented Phillips curve ("surprise aggregate supply
function). An unanticipated rise in intlation of one percentage point increases the level of
output by h percentage points.~ Hence h is the slope of the Phillips curve.
Taking first differences of (2) and substituting for Dy, from (1) yields
~ This rclauon ~an hc JrnvrJ f'rom thc nommal cuntracls appruach uf Fi.cher (1977).4
Dy, - Gy~ } h(OPc - Opt-t) - h(Fz-tOp~ - Ez-Z~pt-t)
- ao t(h - at)~pt - h ~pt-1 - h(F.~-tOp, - F.~-Z~p~-t) f ó~ (3)
Equation (3) is a dynamic aggregate supply curve between growth in output, inflati-
on, and expected inflation. To analyze the behaviour of output growth and inflation it is
necessary to close the model by adding another equation between inflation and output
growth and to specify how inflation expectations are formed. We shall add a Cambridge
equation in section 4 and assume a Barro and Gordon (1983) type of macroeconomic
policy regime in section 5. In both these sections we assume in tutn that expectations are
formed adaptively and rationally. We analyze both the steady state and cyclical properties
of the models.
IV THE SUPPLY SIDE EFFECT OF INFLATION IN THE CAMBRIDGE MODEL
Aggregate demand is captured by a simple Cambridge equation (see Canzoneri and
Henderson (1991), p. 12).
~y~ - Omt - OPc (4)
Where Om is the growth rate of the nominal money supply.
Hence the rate of growth of aggregate demand increases with the rate of growth of real
money balances.
4.1 Adaptive Expectations
We consider first an adaptive expectations hypothesis for expected inflation. The
simplest adaptive expectations assumption is that expected inflation in year t is equal to
the actual rate of inflation in year t-1.4 Combining
Ec-tOpc - ~Pc-t
with equations (3) and (4) yields
~mt - ao 2h




1 t h- at `-Z I. h- a i
and




~ If more complicateJ adaptive xhemrs are assumr,cJ. the resulting difkrence ryuahons arc of thc thirJ
ordar or higher and accorJin~ly thc variance ezprcssions arr much ~mirc complicated.5
2h h bc
} lth-at ~y`-t 1 t h- at ~yt-Z } 1 ~ h- at
The average steady state values of inflation and output growth can be obtained by
putting Omt - ~mt-t - ~mt-2 - Am, ~pt - ~Pc-t - ~pt-z - ~pr DYt - ~Yc-~ - ~Yc-2
- ~y and bt - 0. This yields
~P - (~m - ao)I(1 - at) (8)
and
Gy - ao - at Op (9)
where superscript - denotes average values.s
Taking the first derivative of (8) with respect to at, we get
a~p ~m -ao
aat I -ai
From (8) and (10) we derive proposition 4.1.
(10)
PROPOSITION 4.1.: If the rate of growth of nominal money balances exceeds the
average growth rate of the natural rate of output - i.e. if ~m - ao ~ 0- the higher at the
higher the average steady state rate of inflation.
Differentiating (9) with respect to at we find that
8~y -(~m-ao)
aai 1 -at
From (11) we derive proposition 4.2.
PROPOSITION 4.2.: If the rate of growth of nominal money balances exceeds the
average rate of growth of the natural rate of output - i.e. if Gm - ao ~ 0- the higher ai
the lower the average steady state rate of output growth.
Thus with a positive steady-state inflation rate the supply side effect of inflation raise the
average steady state rate of inflation and lower the average steady state rate of growth of
output.
Now we will analyze the consequences of the supply side effect of inflation on economic
fluctuations. As a measure of fluctuation we employ the steady-state or asymptotic
variance, Var (.), which measures the variability of a variable around its long-run
Tha avcrage ur cyuitihrium value ot a vanablr x is JrfineJ ah Ihe mathrmatical ~x~atation of' x al
hmc t, the rxpecteuon heing helJ et the cnJ uf t- I. Thus. X- Et-~xt.6
equilibrium.
Equations (6) and (7) are second-order stochastic difference equations. As a deviation
from its average value, for inflation we have
Opt f s ~pt.t f y ~pt-Z -~t ót
where y- hl(1 f h- at)
Q --2y
~.t - yin





Provided the values of a and y satisfy the stability conditions, the asymptotic variance of
inflation is finite and given by~
,
Var(OP) - (1 `y)~i
(t4)
(1 -y)[(1 }y)Z-R2l
Using the Cambridge equation (4), the variance of output growth is given by
Var (Dy) - Var (Om - Gp) - Var (Op) (15)
Hence in the Cambridge model the variance of growth is proportional to [he variance of
inflation.
If there is no supply side effect of inflation (ai - 0) then the stability conditions are
always fulfilled. In the presence of a supply side effect stability is guaranteed if
y G 1 i.e. if a~ C l. Hence it would require a very large supply side effect from
inflation for the model to become unstable.
We can expand the first derivative of Var (Op) with respect to a( as
aVaz(Op) - ay , aVar(Op) (16)
aat aat 8y
Since the first term on the right hand side of ( l6) is always positiveg the sign of the
F Sce for instance GanJolfo (1983), p. 59.
Srz Bartlett (1962), p. l45 and Appzndix A to this papzr.
x 37 - h
Bat l~.h-atl'-
~ 07
derivative depends upon the sígn of the second term. Taking the first derivative of (14)
with respect to y we find that it is given by
dVar(~p) - -y!8(y-l)(yzt 3~4y,1~4) ~ 0 (17)
ay [3y~-Syzty~l~zhz
From ( 15) and ( 17) we derive proposition (4.3)
PROPOSITION 4.3: The higher at the higher the asymptotic variance of inflation.
To give a numerical example, with h being about 0.5 and a) equal to 0.2 we get Var (~p)
- Var (Dy) - 19 If there is no supply side effect (at - 0), then Var (~p) - Var (Dy)
- 0.67. Thus the ratio of the variance with the supply side effect to the ratio without the
supply side effect is 1.5. This example suggests that, in the Cambridge model with
adaptive expectations, the supply side effect of inflation adds considerably to the magnitu-
de of macroeconomic fluctuations. This completes the description of the results with
adaptive expectations. We now move on to the case of rational expectations.
4.2 Rationa! Expectations
We now consider the case of rationa] expectations. Using the backward-shift (lag)
operator, L, on equation (2) yields
Yc-t - y~-I -t- h(Op~-( - L F.~-~Op~)
Noting that in the case of rational expectations the lag operator operates on the time
subscript of a variable (not on the time at which the ezpectation of that variable is
held))o
we get L E,-I~p~ - Op~-~, using this fact, subtracting (I8) from (2) and substituting for
py~ from (1) yields
- ~yt t h (OPc - Ft-~OPt)
- ao f(h - a))OP, - h Ft-I~Pt } óc
(19)
Combining (19) with equation (4) yields
Om~ - ao
~p` - l- a I t h
h bt
} 1- al t h E`-I~p` 1- at t h
(20)
y For ai we have u.ed thr estimate in Smyth ( 1994). Thr value uf h i~ takcn from Smyth (1992).
~~ For a IuciJ extxi.ihon on thr use of operator algebra in rational cxtxctation~ mod~ls ~ee BlancharJ anJ
Fixhs:r (1989), pp. 264-266.8
Taking expectations conditional on information at the end of t- 1 of (20) we get
Fc-~Omc - ao
Et-tAPc - 1 - at
(21)
Assuming that the rule for the evolutíon of the money supply is known, i.e. F.c-~Omc -
Omt, substituting (21) in (20) we obtain the following closed form solutions for inflation
Omt - ao 1
Apc- I-at - 1-atthbc
and output growth
(22)
~yc - 1 [-ai0mc t aol
1 - ai
1 óc (23)
} 1 - ai t h







Setting ( 3 - y- 0 in equation ( 14) yields
Var (~D) - ~,` - 1
[1 t h - at]2
Taking the first derivative of (24) with respect to a~ we find that it is given by
a Var (Op) - 2 for at c 1 f h
aa~ [1 th-ai]3
From (25) we derive proposition (4.4).
(24)
(25)
PROPOSITION 4.4: If a~ c I f h, the higher ai the higher the variances of growth
and inflation.
To give a numerical example, substituting the same parameter values (h - 0.5 and ai
- 0.2) into eq. (24) yields Var (~p) - Var (~y) - 0.59. If there is no supply side effect
(ai - 0), then Var (Op) - Var (~y) - 0.44. Thus the ratio of the variance with the ratio
ot the variance with the supply side effect to the ratio without the supply side effect is
about 1.3.9
Like in the case of adaptive expectations, this example suggest that the supply side
effect of inflation adds considerably to the magnitude of macrceconomic fluctuations. This
completes the description of the results of the Cambridge modeL We conclude that both
with rational and adaptive expectations, under plausible assumptions the suppiy side effect
of inflation increases the steady state inflation rate, lowers the long-run growth rate and
increases the extent of cyclical fluctuations, measured by the (asymptotic) variances of
growth and inflation.
In the next section we analyze the supply side effect of inflation in the context of a single-
stage Phillips curve monetary policy game.
V A STATIC GAME BETWEEN WAGE-SETTERS AND THE CENTRAL BANK
5.1 The Social Welfare versus the PoliticalApproach to Central Bank Behaviour
In section 4 we assumed that inflation was determined by a Cambridge equation. In
this section following Barro and Gordon (1983) we think of the central bank as choosing
inflation directly. ~~ In order to investigate optimal monetary policy consider a central
bank that is concerned with both price stability and low unemployment. We assume a
quadratic loss function, that penalizes both inflation and unemployment. More specificly
we use
d
Lt - 2 (OPc - ~p " )2 t ~ (Dy~ - k ~yt)z k ) 1, dZ ~ 0 (26)
where Op" and k0y~ are the inflation and growth targets of the central bank. The
parameter d~ measures the weight of output growth stabilization relative to inflation
stabilization in the preferences of the central bank. Thus the target level of output growth
exceeds the natural rate. The assumption that k~ 1 is standard. (Canzoneri (1985)). It
means that the central bank views the natural rate of growth py~ to be too small.
Therefore it aims at a higher output goal. Given the incentive of the central bank to
deviate from the natural rate there is a conflict between wage-setters and the central bank
concerning the optimal rates of inflation and growth. We will return to this point later on.
The central bank chooses Opt and wage-setters "choose" E~-tOp~. Normalizing t1p~` at
zero yields
d,
I-c - ~(OPc)~ ` 2(Dy~ - k Dy~)2 d, ~ 0 (27)
According to Cukierman (1992, p. 43) the recent literature on monetary policy
games has given two competing interpretations to the loss function of the monetary
policymaker in equation (27). One part of the literature regards this function as a social
welfare function and the central bank as a benevolent social planner (Kydland and
~~ For a lucid extxi.ihon uf munctary txilicy game, with ~he monGy aock as txilicy irtstrument .ee
Canzoneri and Hrnderson (1991).lo
Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985) and Canzoneri (1985)). The
other part views the central bank as a mediator between different interest groups that try
to push monetary policy in various directions. On this view, the loss function (3.1)
reflects a distributionally motivated political compromise mediated through the central
bank between the advocates of employment stimulation and the advocates of price stability
(Havrilesky (1987), Willet (1988) and Mayer (1990)). The coefficient d2 then measures
the relative political clout of the two groups (Cukierman and Meltzer (1986a), Cukierman
(1986)).
The social welfare approach seems best suited to describe how a central bank should
behave. However, (Cukierman (1992), p. 43) points ou[ that it is a relatively weak
paradigm for explaining the actual policies chosen by central banks. For as shown by
Bade and Parkin (1988), Alesina (1988, 1989), Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991),
Alesina and Summers (1993) and Eijffinger and Schating (1993) in most countries central
banks are highly dependent on the government in general and the treasury or ministry of
finance in particular. As a result, the policies implemented by central bankers are not
independent from the general political proces in which distributional considerations are
predominant. The impact of these considerations on the choice of policy varies with the
degree of central bank independence. The greater the political independence given to the
bank by law the smaller the impact of distributional and otner political considerations on
monetary policy.
More realisticly, we choose the political approach to central bank behaviour as the
interpretation of equation (27). Hence we view the ccefficient dZ as a measure of the
political dependence of the central bank. The lower d~ the more independent the central
bank12. That is, the degree of central bank independence equals dZ-t
Following Alogoskoufis ((1993), p. 17) we start with a cooperative game, i.e. we
assume that the natural rate of growth is efticient. In the context of the model, this can be
represented by the assumption that k- l. In the latter case the central bank has no
incentive to try and increase the rate of growth above its natural rate. As there is no
conflict between the output growth targets of wage setters and the central bank, the policy
game can be seen as a cooperative one13. This state of affairs is summarized in the first
column of table l.
An alternauve approach is expGcit mod~IGng of thc interactinn of' srparate monetary and Fiscal
authoritics. Sae c.e. Al~cina anJ Tahcllini (1987) and Cukierman (1992). pp. 3~1-355.
13 For a reviaw of some important concepts of game thr,ory ~x Blackhurn anJ Christensen (1989).tl
Tnble I
Policv Games nnd Output Growrh Targets
Wage-Setters Central Bank
k - 1
o ' - o-
k ~ l
oy ' ~ oy
Natural Rate Efficient Inefficient
Policy Game Cooperative Non-Cooperative
We now turn to the second column of table 1, i.e. the situation where the central
bank views the natural rate of growth pyt to be too small. In what follows we show that
then the equilibrium inflation rate becomes proportional to the average rate of growth
(ao). In this case discretionary monetary policy is no longer a Pareto-equilibrium, due to
the time-inconsistency of optimal monetary policy.
5.2 Optimal Monetary Policy Under Rational Expectations
Assuming that k~ 1 the central bank has incentives to systematically create inflation in
order to raise the rate of output growth above its natural rate. From the first order
conditions for a minimum of (27) i.e. aLt - p we get
aÓpc
a(~yt - k ~yt)
~pt - -d,(DYt - k Dyt)
80pt
(28)
Substituting the equations for the growth rate of the natural level of output ( 1), and the
"Phillips curve" ( 19) into the first-order condition we obtain the central bank's reaction
function to private sector's expectations
Qpt - -dzh ,
[(1 - k)(ao ' St) - h F,-i~Ptl (29)
I t d,h-
where h- h-(I - k)a~ ~ 0. Note that if there is no supply side effect of inflation
(at - 0), then h - h.
(29) gives the rate of inflation desired by the central bank under discretion.
Again it is necessary to specify how inflation expectations are formed. The Barro and
Gordon (1983) model features consistent or rational expectations. Therefore first we
analyze the rational expectations case. [n section 5.2 we modify this assumption and turn
to adaptive expectations.
Taking expectations conditional on information at t- 1 of (29) gives
-d~h
Et ~~Pt - 1 t d~h(h- h)
((1 - k)aol (30)Iz
Equation (30) is the reaction function of wage setters. Upon substituting (30) in (29) we
get
-d2h(1 - k) dZh(1 - k)
~p~ - 1 t d21i (h - h) ~- 1 t d2h2
ó~ (31)
Figure I shows the central bank's reaction function for the non-stochastic Barro and
Gordon (1983) case (at - ór - 0), i.e. the average inflation rate as a function of the
expected inflation rate. t4
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
The only point at which expectations are rational is at point N, which represents the
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Note that the greater h(i.e. the greater the increase in
output from unanticipated inflatíon) and the larger the distortion k- 1, the greater the
inflation benefits of appointing independent central banks.
We now consider the stochastic case with the supply side effect of inflation, i.e.




1 t dzti[-(1 - k)at]
Hence, average inflation is above zero (the outcome in the cooperative case where k-
l).
Subtracting (30) from (31) we obtain the following expression for unanticipated inflation.
Qpt E[-IQpt - -dzli(1 - k) ó[ (33)
1 t dZ}tz
Combining eq. (33) with (19) and ( 1) we get
d,h[h(I- k)-h]- 1 1
OPc - - [~Yc ' , óc - ao]
-at 1 , d~h-
(34)
Now, we derive the solution for output growth. Upon substituting (34) in (31) we get
1 d~hhk t 1
Ay~ - . ~ b,
I t dzh (h - h) ~ 1 t dzh-
The average value of output growth is
(35)
~a This tigure u be.~J on a similar one in BlancharJ anJ Fischer (1989). p. 597.13
Dy, - ao - a i OPt (9)
Equations (32) and (9) highlight the time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy.
The monetary policy strategy of the central bank, i.e. equation (29) is time-consistent in
the sense that at each point in time the inflation rate selected is best, given the current
situation. However, as can be seen from equations (32) and (9), the resulting policy is
socially sub-optimal. It is suboptimal since it results in an excessive level of inflation, i.e.
it produces an inflationary bias.
Moreover, because of this inflationary bias the average rate of growth is reduced.
Due to the presence of supply-side effects, time consistent monetary policy results in a
lower steady-state growth rate than in the absence of supply side effects of inflation (a~ -
0). This is a major difference with the Barro and Gordon (1983) Phillips curve monetary
policy game. In the latter model time consistent monetary policy cannot reduce output
beneath its natural rate. Hence, in the present model time consistent monetary policy
creates a stagfla~ionary bias. This state of affairs is summarized in Table 2.
Tnble 2
Stag~lmiarary Bi~u of Time Corisis~enr Mone~nrv Policy






pP ao - a~ Op
Bias - (b)'I- (a) Qp - a, ~~} I'~.
We can expand the first derivative of the average inflation rate i.e. equation (32) with
respect to a~, as
8~pt aOPt ah (1 - k)Z dzao
aa~ - ah aai -[I t dZh[-(1 - k)a~llz
~ 0 (36)
From (36) we derive proposition (5.1)
PROPOSITION 5.1: The higher the supply side effect of inflation - i.e. the higher ai -
the higher the average rate of inFlation.
Differentiating (9) with respect to at we find that
aa yt -- l ai aapt }
~pJ
c 0 (37)14
From (37) we derive proposition (5.2).
PROPOSITION 5.2: The higher at the lower the average rate of output growth.
Thus no matter what parameter values we assume, in the Barro and Gordon (1983)
game-theoretic model of monetary policy the supply side effects of inflation raise the
equilibrium steady state rate of inflation and lower the equilibrium steady state rate of
growth of output.
This is different from the results in the Cambridge model. There it was shown that
the supply side effect of inflation increases inflation and reduces the growth rate if the
rate of growth of nominal money balances exceeds the average rate of growth of the
natural rate of output i.e. if Om - ao ~ 0.
Hence, being unconditional, results in the Barro Gordon model are more robust.






Setting (3 - ti- 0 in equation ( 14) yields the variance of inflation
2 d2h2 (1 -k)2
Var (Op~) - ~t -
[I td,h2]2
We can expand the tirst derivative of Var (Op~) with respect to a~ as
a Var (Op,) d Var(Op,) ah a~,
aa~ - 8~, aa, ah
(38)
(39)
Since the first two terms on the right hand side of (39) ar always positive15, the sign of
the derivative depends upon the sign of the last term.
Taking the first derivative of ),~ with respect to h we find that it is given by
a)`i -d,(1 -k)[1 -dZh'] 1 40
ah [1 tdZhz]'- ~ h'-
From (40) we derive proposition 5.3.
1 0 for d, c- O
a VarWp,) dh
- 2J~, ~ 0. - -( ~-kl 7 0
aa, a~,IS
PROPOSITION 5.3: If dz c 1, the higher at the higher the variance of inflation.
h2
To give a numerical example, assuming that k- 2 and the other parameters as before (h
- 0.5 and a, - 0.2) the weight of ouput growth stabilization relative to inflation
stabiliza[ion in the preferences of the central bank must be smaller than 2.
Identifying a fully independent central band with a value for d2 of zero we can state the
following. If the central bank is not too dependent, with rational expecations the relation
between inflation and growth (at) will accentuate the variability of inflation.
Now we will analyze the consequences of the supply side effect of inflation on output
growth. As a deviation from its average value, the equation for output growth (35) may
be written as
oy, - ~, s~ (41)
where ~, - dzhhk f 1
1 tdzh
Setting ~- y- 0 in equation (14) yields
2
Var (~y~) - ~~ - [dzhhk . I] (42)
[1 t d2h2]2
We can expand the first derivative of Var (~y~) with respect to a, as
8 Var(Dy~) ah a Var(Dy~) a~, (4,t)
aa~ - aa~ a~~ ali
Since the first two terms on the right handside of (43) are always positive, the sign of the
derivative depends upon the sign of the last term.
Taking the first derivative of ~, with respect to h we find that it is given by
a~, d2[hk-dzhhzk-2hJ
~ 0
ah - [1 fdzhz]z




PROPOSITION 5.4: If d, c hk - 2h 1 the higher a, the higher the variance of
ouput growth. hk J h'`
To give a numerical example, with the same parameter values as before the weight of
output growth stabilization relative to inFlation stabilization in the preferences of the
central bank must be smaller that -0.8. Since ex hypothesi d, 1 0 this numerical example
suggests that with rational expectations the supply side effect of inflation may have a
stabilizing effect on the real side of the economy. This completes the description of the
resulrs of the Phillips curve monetary policy game with rational expectations. We now16
move on to the case of adaptive expectations.
5.3 Optimal Monetary Policy Under Adaptive Erpectations
Originally the Barro and Gordon (1983) model features consistent or rational
expectations. In order to maintain symmetry with section 4 we now modify this assumpti-
on. In this sub-section we assume that expectations are formed adaptively.
Taking first differences of equation (2) and substituting F.c-tGpc - Apc-t yields
~yc - ~yc f hOpc - 2hOpc-t t h~pc-z (45)
Substituting equations (1) and (45) into (28) we obtain a closed form solution for inflation
under adaptive expectations
dZh
~Pc -- ,[(1 - k)(ae t óc) [-2h]~pc-~ t hOpc-2]
1 t d2h-
Combining equations ( 1) and (45) we get
Pc - 0 1 [~Yc - (ao } bc)]
[h - at -2hL t hL2]
(46)
(47)
where L is the backward-shift (lag) operator.
Now, we derive the solution for ouput growth. Upon substituting (47) in (46) we get
1 dzh[-2h] dZhh 1 t dZhhk




1 t d h` ót ~} 1 t d hz St
~ (48)
2 2
The steady state results on average inFlation and ou[put growth are the same as with
rational expectations. Using the notation of equation (12), for inflation we have
d.,lih
7 - t }`d'h,
R--?y
~' - -(1 -k)
7
h
If there is no supply side effect of inf]ation (ac - 0) then the stability conditions are
always fulfilled. In the presence of a supply side effect stability is guaran[eed if y c 1
i.e. d, ~ - 1 . Since ex hypothesi d, ~ 0 with the supply side effect of inflation
- h(it-h)17
stability is also guaranteed.
Hence, the asymptotic variance of Opt is finite and given by
Var(~P) -
(1 t ti) ~ t
(1-y)[(1 ty)2-BZ]
(1a)
We can expand the first derivative of Var (Gp) with respect to at as
a Vaz(Op) - ali a Var(~p) a y (49)
aat - áat ~ ati ' a6
The first term on the right hand side of (49) is always positivelb Taking the first
derivative of (14) with respect y we find that it is given by
a Var(Op) -yl8(y - 1)(1 -k)Z (tiz t314ry t Il4) ) 017 (50)
aY [3y3-Sy2tytl]2 hz
Hence, the sign of a Var(Op) depends upon the sign of ati . Taking the first derivative
aal ah
of y with respect to h, we find that it is given by
ay - d2h[1 -dZhZ] , 0 for d c 1
aii [1 tdZh2]2 z hz
From (51) we derive proposition (5.5)
(51)
PROPOSITION 5.5: If dZ c 1~ , the higher al the higher the asymptotic variance of
inflation. h`
This is the same condition as with rational expectations (see proposition 5.3). Thus, both
wíth rational and adaptive expectations if the central bank is not too dependent the
relation between inflation and growth (al) will accentuate the variability of inflation.
Now we will analyze the consequences of the supply side effect of inflation on output
growth.
The variance of output growth in terms of the parameters a, y, ~I, ~2 and 1`3 may be
obtained from (48)tg it is
Var(DY) -
[(1 tY)(xl } ~Z ' ~~ - 2ry~tl`3) - 2S~t~2]
(52)
(1-ti)[(1 ty)Z - RZ]
iv ah - -(1 -k) ~ 0
aai
It can be shown that with adaptivr expectations thC asymptotic variancr in the Phillips curve monztary
policy game eyuals (1 - k)'- the asymptoUC variance of inFlation in the Cambndge model. Hance (50) is
eyual to ( I - k)- . (17).







z 1 ~ dzhz
1
~3 a - ~ ~2
We can expand the first derivative of Var (~y) with respect to at as
a var(oy) - ai, ay aVaz(~y) (53)
aat aat ~ ah ~ ay
Since ah is always positive, from (51) we know that the first two terms on the right
aat
hand side of (53) are positive if d c 1
z hz
However, the relevant derivative also depends on the sign of the last term. Determining
the sign of the first derivative of (52) with respect to ti involves the solution fo a fifth-
order equation.19 Therefore we turn to implicit differentiation. Rewriting (52) in
(equivalent) implicit form, totally differentiating this expression and approximating the
last term on the right hand side of (53) by dVar (~y)Idy, we get
a Var(~y) - k[8k -Az] zo
(54)
a1' 4k-Az
where the reduced form arameter
1 td,hhk
p A- .(see equation (52)). From (51) and
(54) we derive proposition (5.6). d,hh
z
PROPOSITION 5.6: If dz c 1 and k[8k - A] ) 0 the higher at the higher the
liz 4k -Az
asymptotic variance of output growth.
In appendix B we show that for (54) to be positive the ratio between the transient and the
stochastic response effects (Howrey (1967), p. 410) of the linear system (48) should be
greater than a certain boundary value.
With the same parameter values as before both (51) and (54) are positive suggesting
that in the adaptive expectations version of the monetary policy game the relation between
inflation and growth (at) will accentuate the variability of growth.
Note 1ha1 wilh aJaptivr expectauons m urel~r to Jetermme thc sign of B Var (Jp)lay w~ haJ tu sul~'a
third-orJer tquations. ScY txprossions (50) and (171.
'-~ For the Jerivation sr.c AppenJix B to this paper.19
VI CONCLUSIONS
In the present paper we have analyzed the supply side effects of inflation for two
major monetary models. We find that the steady state inflation rate is increased and the
steady state output growth rate is reduced. These results hold both for the Cambridge
model, and for the Barro and Gordon (1983) game-theoretic model. A further finding is
the following. Due to the inflation sensitive growth rate in the natural level of output, in
the game-theoretic model of monetary policy time consistent inflation policy causes a
stagflatronary bias. This is a major difference with the standard Barro and Gordon (1983)
framework were monetary policy cannot reduce output beneath its natural rate.
The extent of cyclical fluctuations of ouput growth, measured by the asymptotic
variances, is increased in the Cambridge model and in the Barro and Gordon (1983)
model of monetary policy with adaptive expectations.
Finally, inflation variability, measured by the asymptotic variances of inflation is
increased in both the Phillips' curve and the Barro and Gordon (1983) model. These
results hold irrespective of whether inflation expectations are determined adaptively or
rationally.
APPENDIX A DERIVATION OF THE ASYMPTOTIC VARIANCE OF OUTPUT
GROWTH FROM EQUATION (48).
In this appendix we derive the asymptotic variance of output growth from
~Y~ } a~Yc-~ f Y DY~-z -~tói f)`z b~-t t~3 b~-z (A1)
The method by which the variance of output is obtained is that of Fischer and Cooper
(1973, p. 874).
Multiply (A1) by Dy~, ~y~-i, GYt.z, bt, bt-t and ót.z, successively, and take expectations:
denote by oo, ai and vz the (asymptotic) variance of output growth E(~yiz), the first
autocovariance E(Dyt~y,-~) and the second autocovariance E(Dy~Dy~-2) respectively.
Note that the autocovariance function is stationary so that
E(~YcOYc-1) - E(~Ytt~~Yc)
We get
va ~- wt f Yvz - J~~E(Aytb~) t~zE(b~-~~yi) -F~~ E(óc-z DYi)
(3ap ~- ( 1 f y)oi - ~`zE(Dyc-~ b~-i)





E(ót-tAYc) - ~2 - SE(ót-tOYc-t)




Solving this set of equations ((A2) -(A7)) for ao - noting that E(ócAyt) - E(bt-tOYt-t) -
E(bt-ZDyt-Z) - one obtains equation (52) of the text. Note that equations (14), (24) and (42)
are special cases of eq. (52). For the second order case equation (14) follows from (52) if
)`Z - ~3 - 0. In the zeroth order case, equations (42) and (24) result if ~Z - ~3 - ~ -
y-0.
APPENDIX B THE DERIVATION OF EQUATION (54).
In this appendiz we tum to implicit differentiation of equation (52) in order to determine
the sign of aVar (Dy)18y.
Following Chiang (1984), pp. 204-209 we write (52) in the equivalent form
ao -
[(lty)(~tt~Z}~3-2yXt~3)-2S~t~z1 - O (B.l)
(1 - y) I(1 t y)2 - ~Z)
where ap - Var(0 y)
Now we no longer have an explicit function for Var (~y). Rather the function (52) is only
implicity defined by equation (B.1).
In general (B.1) can be denoted by
F(ao, B, y, ~t, ~2, ~3) - 0 (B.2)
Totally differentiating (B.2) yields
FQOdao t FRda t Fydy t F~~d~t t FM d~Z . F~~d~3 - 0 (B.3)
where F~ denotes the partial derivative of the function F with~espect to argument i. Upon
dividing through by dy, noting that Foo -) and solving for ao we get
dy
dap da d~t d~2 d~3
áy -- dy Fp - Fy - dy FJ~~ - dy Fa, - dy F~j
From the definitions of St, ~t, ~Z and i`3 it follows that
dQ - 2 d~t -
A. d~2 --2k and d~3 - k
dy dy dy dy
Substituting the latter results in (B.4) yields
dao





F- dF d~ -- 2 F and F - A F we get ti d~ ay B at - k R
k2(F 2F dao - F~ - ~y - )~)
(B.6)
dy 4k - A2
By definition
dF dF d~2 ~ - ~ thus
F d~3 - d~2 d~3
- -2F
dap 4k2F~
- Fs t (B.7)
dy 4k-t1Z
From (B.7) it follows that
dao )
0 for Fs 1 -4k2 (B 8)
dy F~, 4k - A2
Where broadly speaking - following Howrey (1967), p. 410 - F~ F inay be interpre-
ted as respectively the transient and the stochastic response "effects" o~ the linear system
(48). Thus a change in y increases the asymptotic variance if the ratio between the
transient and the stochastic response effect passes a lower bound defined by the strucutu-
ral parameters d2, h, k and al. Noting that
F~ - dF d~2 - d~2 - d~2 dy --2k .- 1 - k,
FM d~ dF ds dy ds 2
i.e. that the latter ratio is equal to k, we get
dao - k[8k - A2] (B.9)
dy 4k-A2
Apptroximating BVar (Ay)lay by dao yields equation (54).
dy
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